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Microeconomics II (Game Theory)

  • Post-exam review "Microeconomics II":  21.04.2017, 16:00, 4.319 (SSC)
  • Lecture:

    • Tuesday, 16:00 - 17:30
      Hörsaal XIb, Main Building
    • Wednesday, 16:00 - 17:30
      Hörsaal V, Main Building
    • Lecture starts 18.10.2016

  • Tutorial:

    • Group 1: Thursday, 12:00 - 13:30
      Hörsaal V, Main Building
      Tutorial of group 1 starts 20.10.2016
    • Group 2: Tuesday, 12:00 - 13:30
      Seminar Room S93, Seminar Building
      Tutorial of group 2 starts 25.10.2016 

Structure and organization: The course consists of a Lecture (taught by Michael Greinecker) and a Tutorial (taught by Jaume García-Segarra). The Lecture will present the basic concepts and main references. The tutorial will be used to discuss exercises and present additional references and applications.

Important Information: (download PDF here)
The course “Microeconomics II” is offered every semester and satisfies the requirements for the “Aufbaumodul Mikroökonomik” (PO 2015) and the module “Mikroökonomik (Spieltheorie und Industrieökonomik)” (PO 2007/2008), respectively. Please note that the courses “Microeconomics II” offered in the winter and summer term, respectively, differ with regard to their content and structure.

  •  In the winter term the course “Microeconomics II” is offered in English and in one single part (4h + Tutorial) as “Microeconomics II (Game Theory)” by Prof. Alós-Ferrer.
  • In the summer term the course “Microeconomics II” is offered in German jointly by Prof. Ockenfels and Prof. Höffler. The course (4h + Tutorial) is split into the two parts “Spieltheorie” (first part of the semester, Prof. Ockenfels) and “Industrieökonomik” (second part of the semester, Prof. Höffler).

Content:

  1. Introduction
  2. Normal-Form Games

    1. Dominant Strategies
    2. Nash Equilibria
    3. Zero-Sum Games and Common-Interest Games
    4. Application: Oligopoly

  3. Mixed Strategies

    1. Expected Utility
    2. Existence of Nash Equilibria
    3. Evolutionary Games

  4. Extensive-Form Games

    1. Subgame Perfection
    2. Imperfect Information
    3. Behavioral Strategies
    4. Perfect Recall and Kuhn's Theorem

  5. Repeated Games

    1. Folk Theorems
    2. Application: Incentives to Collusion

  6. Bayesian Games

    1. Bayes-Nash Equilibria
    2. Application: Auctions

  7. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

    1. Definition
    2. Signalling Games
    3. Application: Spence's Job Market

Literature:

  • R. GIBBONS, “A primer in Game Theory”, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
  • H.S. BIERMAN and L. FERNANDEZ, “Game Theory with Economic
    Applications”, 2nd Edition, Addison Wesley, 1998.
  • P. DUTTA, “Strategies and Games”, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998.
  • H. WIESE “Entscheidungs- und Spieltheorie”, Springer Verlag, Berlin
    Heidelberg Vienna, 2002.