Evolution and Networks

Research Statement

Bounded rationality plays an important role in modern economics. This long-standing research line, which involves a fair number of different collaborators, deals with its modelling and consequences. The basic setting involves the analysis of stochastic dynamics in discrete time where players recurrently interact in a given strategic situation of interest (a game). It relies on the analysis of stochastic behavioral rules

  • Alós-Ferrer and Netzer (2010) provide analytical tools and first results for a particularly interesting dynamics which had previously eluded general analysis: the logit-response dynamics.
  • A number of works (Alós-Ferrer 2004, 2008; Alós-Ferrer and Shi, forthcoming) have studied the role of memory for equilibrium (and non-equilibrium) when players employ imitation rules.
  • In collaboration with Simon Weidenholzer (University of Essex), one line of work (Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010) studies equilibrium selection on games played in networks.



  • Imitation and Learning
    Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Karl Schlag.
    The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, ed. by P. Anand, P. Pattanaik and C. Puppe, Oxford University Press, 2009.
  • Contagion and Efficiency
    Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Simon Weidenholzer.
    Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 143, No. 1, November 2008, pp. 251-274.
  • The Asset Market Game
    Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Ana B. Ania.
    Journal of Mathematical Economics,Vol. 41, No. 1-2, February 2005, pp. 67-90.
  • An Evolutionary Model of Market Structure
    Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Ana B. Ania.
    The Theory of Markets, ed. G. van der Laan, P.J.J. Herings, and A.J.J. Talman, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1999.

    Relevant Research Projects

    • DFG Project Al-1169/5-1, "Stochastic Stability in Networks and Markets", Principal Investigator: Carlos Alós-Ferrer.